andrew-bacon

Possible paper prompts

Some possible questions you could consider in your paper.

• Is it possible that space has a fourth dimension? What are the philosophical implications if so?

• Are regions made up of points, or is space `gunky’ in the sense that there are regions but no points?
  • What sort of primitives would you need to theorize about this kind of space?
  • Physical theories often make reference to points – a field, for instance, is treated as an assignment of quantities to points. Could these theories be reformulated if space were gunky?
  • What would it mean for an object to move continuously if space were gunky?
• Could space be discrete, in the sense that there are only finitely many points between any two points, and points have volume?
  • How would the distance between two points be measured?
  • What would it mean for an object to move continuously if space were discrete?
• Is Kant’s argument against relationism sound?
  • Is a hand in othewise empty space either left or right?
  • What is the significance of four dimensional spaces, and non-orientable spaces.
• Discuss and evaluate Kant’s theory of space, in which space has structure beyond Euclidean structure distinguishing left from right.
  • Could four dimensional space, and non-orientable spaces be possible according to this theory?
  • You could discuss the significance of this extra structure for the internalist.
• What is Nerlich’s argument for absolute space, and is it sound?
  • In what ways does it improve on Kant’s argument.
  • Could the relationist accept Nerlich’s premise that a hand in empty space is either an enantomorph or a homomorph while still rejecting the existence of space?

• Compare and contrast the relationist and the substantivalist theories of space

• Discuss Leibniz’s argument (against substantivalism) from the principle of sufficient reason
  • What are some other implications of the principle, and are they plausibe?
• Discuss Leibniz’s argument (against substantivalism) from the principle of identity of indiscernables
  • Is the principle of identity of indiscernables plausible?

• Discuss Newton’s bucket argument (or the argument from two globes).

  • Is there a difference between two stationary globes connected by a string, and two such globes moving in circular motion?
  • Could one, following Mach, reject the existence of such a difference? What would this sort of thheory look like, and how would it differ from Newton’s theory of motion?
  • Could a relationist help themselves to further primitives (beyond, say, spatial distance and measure of time) that might help distinguish between the rotating and stationary globes?

• It is widely thought that the unobservable notion of absolute rest is not in good standing, and should be excised from Newton’s theory of space. Do the reasons for eliminating absolute rest extend to reasons for eliminating other unobservables like position in space?

  • Why does Newton’s theory of a 1-dimensional time and a 3-dimensional space commit you to a notion of absolute rest?
  • What is Gallilean spacetime (sometimes called “Neo Newtonian” spacetime), and how does it avoid the commitment to absolute rest?
  • Do we have equally good reasons to eliminate other unobservables like position, in space and in time. Why should we treat these differently from absolute rest?
• Must the relationist appeal to primitive relations to numbers in order to formulate their theory, and is this a problem?
  • Why can’t the relationist appeal to a Euclidean theory of geometry, in terms of congruence and betweenness?
  • Is it troublesome when a physical theory posits among its geometrical primitives, primitive relations to abstract objects like real numbers?
  • What is the problem of scale, and can it be overcome?